commonly referred to as young-earth creationism (YEC) passes the three standard subtests of systematic consistency rooted in the
The rationalist tends to be suspicious of personal experience.
The experientialist tends to ignore any evidences which undermine personal experience.
The evidentialist tends to forget that reason is required to interpret facts as evidence for one view or another.
A combinational approach, however, betters the situation by incorporating each of these individual tests into a larger analytical scheme.
Such an approach has sometimes been referred to as the test of systematic consistency.
However, it must be remembered that the test of systematic consistency is a probabilistic test. That is, within the scope of the information presently available to us, the more tests a model passes, the more probable it is that the model corresponds to reality. If it appears to surpass other models in passing these tests, then it is more likely than those models to be true.
As we consider whether or not the YEC model demonstrates a systematic consistency in its account of reality, we are, in fact, evaluating its level of probability as being the correct creation model. The correct creation model should have full correspondence with both God’s Word and God’s world.
The first subtest of systematic consistency is that of logical consistency. This test follows one of the three laws of logic—that is, the law of non-contradiction, which says that A is not non-A.
Technically speaking, logical inconsistency encapsulates not only contradiction but also another closely related form of logical inconsistency called contrariety.
As we consider whether or not the YEC model demonstrates a systematic consistency in its account of reality, we are, in fact, evaluating its level of probability as being the correct creation model. The correct creation model should have full correspondence with both God’s Word and God’s world.
The first subtest of systematic consistency is that of logical consistency. This test follows one of the three laws of logic—that is, the law of non-contradiction, which says that A is not non-A.
Technically speaking, logical inconsistency encapsulates not only contradiction but also another closely related form of logical inconsistency called contrariety.
Contrariety is often confused for contradiction, so clarification is in order. Two propositions contradict one another if the truth of one entails the falsity of the other and if the falsity of one entails the truth of the other. Contrary propositions are similar in that they cannot both be true. However, they differ from contradictories in that they can both be false. Contradiction and contrariety are, in fact, the only two forms of logical inconsistency. .webp)
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Therefore, if a set of propositions is to be determined as being false, one simply needs to identify at least one contradiction or contrariety within the set. On the other hand, if no contradiction or contrariety can be identified, then the set of propositions as a paradigm stands as a viable candidate for truth.
YEC model affirms that God has established a regularity in natural processes governed by natural laws (Thus says the Lord: If I have not established My covenant with day and night and the fixed order of heaven and earth, Jeremiah 33:25).
No scientist denies that both uniform and catastrophic processes play a role in shaping the earth. The YEC scientist simply grants a larger role to the catastrophic than do most other scientists.
The second subtest of systematic consistency is that of empirical adequacy. The concept has been emphasized by philosopher Bas C. van Fraassen and, put simply, refers to the scientific accuracy of a theory. According to van Fraassen, a theory is judged to be.webp)
empirically adequate “exactly if what it says about observable things and events in the world is true—exactly if it ‘saves the phenomena’”.
Keep in mind, however, that raw data are subject to interpretation. As Stephen Jay Gould notes: “Facts do not ‘speak for themselves’; they are read in the light of theory. … [Science is] not a mechanized, robotlike accumulation of objective information, leading by laws of logic to inescapable interpretation.”
The YEC model can be demonstrated to be empirically adequate in two respects.
YEC model affirms that God has established a regularity in natural processes governed by natural laws (Thus says the Lord: If I have not established My covenant with day and night and the fixed order of heaven and earth, Jeremiah 33:25).
No scientist denies that both uniform and catastrophic processes play a role in shaping the earth. The YEC scientist simply grants a larger role to the catastrophic than do most other scientists.
The second subtest of systematic consistency is that of empirical adequacy. The concept has been emphasized by philosopher Bas C. van Fraassen and, put simply, refers to the scientific accuracy of a theory. According to van Fraassen, a theory is judged to be
.webp)
Keep in mind, however, that raw data are subject to interpretation. As Stephen Jay Gould notes: “Facts do not ‘speak for themselves’; they are read in the light of theory. … [Science is] not a mechanized, robotlike accumulation of objective information, leading by laws of logic to inescapable interpretation.”
The YEC model can be demonstrated to be empirically adequate in two respects.
First, its account of reality can consistently integrate the known scientific data within its paradigm.
Second, it can account for data for which rival creation models cannot. Both criteria must be met in order for the model to be a competitive scientific model.
The third subtest of systematic consistency is that of experiential relevance.
Of the three subtests discussed in this paper, that of experiential relevance tends to be the most difficult to demonstrate. This is because experience, while real, is often privatized and interpreted subjectively. This in turn leads to conflicts between personal experiences—or, really, conflicts between interpretations of these experiences.
The greatest point of experiential relevance for the YEC model is its explanation for the problem of evil. The model maintains that God’s original creation was free from pain, suffering, and death. Such
things are consequences of sin’s entrance into the world at the fall of man.
The YEC model affirms this inner sense and offers a satisfactory explanation for its validity: things are not the way they are supposed to be because the originally very good creation free from pain, suffering, and death has been lost.
The third subtest of systematic consistency is that of experiential relevance.
Of the three subtests discussed in this paper, that of experiential relevance tends to be the most difficult to demonstrate. This is because experience, while real, is often privatized and interpreted subjectively. This in turn leads to conflicts between personal experiences—or, really, conflicts between interpretations of these experiences.
The greatest point of experiential relevance for the YEC model is its explanation for the problem of evil. The model maintains that God’s original creation was free from pain, suffering, and death. Such
The YEC model affirms this inner sense and offers a satisfactory explanation for its validity: things are not the way they are supposed to be because the originally very good creation free from pain, suffering, and death has been lost.
However, the Bible also offers the good news that we will one day see the heavens and the earth restored to their originally very good state free from sin and all its consequences."
CMI
