Sunday, March 1, 2020

IN the NEWS - Judge Tuitt

And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. Genesis 1:26

"Having failed to have a court declare chimpanzees to be persons entitled to habeas corpus protection, the Nonhuman Rights Project next tried the same thing with an elephant named Happy, that — not who — is held in her own pen at the Bronx Zoo due to behavioral conflicts with other elephants.


This case also just failed. But before we applaud and say, “Well, of course,” it is clear that New York Supreme Court (the name of the trial court in that state) Justice Alison Y. Tuitt only dismissed the case because she felt bound by precedent.

Justice Tuitt clearly wanted to declare Happy a “person.”
Still, it provided a splendid pretext for her to add her voice in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project so it could use her opinion in its advocacy memes (which it did quickly).
From Tuitt’s ruling:
"This court is extremely sympathetic to Happy’s plight and the NhRP’s mission on her behalf. It recognizes that Happy is an extraordinary animal with complex cognitive abilities, an intelligent being with advanced analytical abilities akin to human beings…
The Court agrees that Happy is more than just a legal thing, or property. She is an intelligent, autonomous who [note the “who”] should be treated with respect and dignity, and may be entitled to liberty."

 First, we don’t treat animals as mere things or as being akin to inanimate objects. After all, we don’t have granite welfare laws.
We don’t have beach-sand welfare laws. But we do have animal welfare laws — precisely because we understand that animals are sentient, have emotions, and can feel pain — meaning, as a matter of human exceptionalism, we have the duty to treat them humanely.
Second, even if Happy had been declared a person, she would not have been granted “liberty.” Rather, her custodial care would simply have been transferred from the zoo to an elephant sanctuary. Happy would have had no choice in the matter.
Third, if animals obtained “legal standing” to sue, it would enable the most radical and extreme animal rights advocates to weaponize the courts as a potent means of advancing their obsessions at the expense of human needs and courtroom resources. The animals supposedly doing the suing would be utterly oblivious.

But we shouldn’t elevate animals artificially to a co-equal moral status with us, because that would actually reduce our own moral status without warrant to theirs.
Or to put it another way,
if we ever come to see ourselves as merely another species of animal in the forest, that is precisely how we will act."
EN&V